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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
 
Jamal Darraj )    Docket No.  2015-01-0339 
 ) 
v. ) 
 )    State File No.  55851-2015  
McKee Foods Corporation, et al. )     
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )
  
 
Affirmed and Certified as Final – January 17, 2017 
 
The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits arising from a gradual, repetitive 
injury to his hands and arms, a traumatic sprain/strain to his hands and arms, a traumatic 
aggravation of his pre-existing upper extremity arthritis, or some combination thereof.  
The authorized treating physician opined that the employee’s condition was not primarily 
caused by his work activities.  The employee presented expert opinions suggesting that 
his condition was primarily caused by his employment.  Following a trial, the court 
denied the employee’s claim, concluding that the medical evidence offered by the 
employee did not overcome the presumption of correctness accorded the authorized 
treating physician’s opinion.  Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the 
determination of the trial court, dismiss the employee’s claim, and certify the 
compensation order as final. 
 
Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 
Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge David F. Hensley joined. 
 
Jamal Darraj, Ringgold, Georgia, employee -appellant, pro se 
 
J. Bartlett Quinn, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, McKee Foods 
Corp. 
 
 
2 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 Jamal Darraj (“Employee”), a fifty-nine-year-old resident of Ringgold, Georgia, 
alleged an injury to his hands and/or wrists arising primarily out of and in the course and 
scope of his employment with McKee Foods Corporation (“Employer”) in Hamilton 
County, Tennessee.  It is unclear from Employee’s statements and filings the precise 
theory of recovery.  He sought workers’ compensation benefits for a gradually-occurring 
repetitive trauma to his hands, an acute traumatic sprain/strain to his wrists, an 
aggravation of his pre-existing upper extremity arthritis, or some combination thereof.  
He alleges the injury occurred and/or his condition became symptomatic on July 19, 
2015, when he was feeding cardboard into a machine called a “former,” which shaped the 
cardboard into boxes.  Due to defective cardboard or a machine malfunction, he was 
required to repetitively bend the cardboard so it would feed into the machine properly.  
After doing this for some period of time, he suffered pain in both wrists and thumbs, and 
he reported the incident that day. 
 
 Employee was provided a panel of physicians from which he chose Dr. Marshall 
Jemison.  Because Dr. Jemison was not immediately available, Employer authorized an 
initial visit with Dr. McKinley Lundy so Employee could be seen more quickly.  Dr. 
Lundy saw Employee on July 21, 2015 for complaints of bilateral wrist pain.  Employee 
acknowledged having had a previous right carpal tunnel release, but he denied any 
symptoms in either wrist for a substantial period of time prior to July 19, 2015.  Dr. 
Lundy diagnosed Employee with bilateral wrist sprain and bilateral forearm strain and 
referred him for physical therapy.  He allowed Employee to return to work with 
restrictions. 
 
 Employee first saw Dr. Jemison on July 30, 2015, at which time Dr. Jemison noted 
his bilateral wrist pain was not the result of a particular injury, but he had been doing 
“more” with his hands and wrists when his symptoms began.  Dr. Jemison diagnosed 
Employee with arthritis of the thumbs and wrists and opined he “[did] not believe that 
these conditions [were] primarily related to his work activities as there was no injury and 
his arthritis is very significant.”  Upon receipt of this opinion, Employer denied the claim, 
asserting Employee’s condition did not arise primarily out of the employment. 
 
 Employee then sought an opinion from Dr. Joseph Burton, a forensic pathologist, 
who provided his assessment in an undated note.  Dr. Burton opined, “[Employee] 
actually has an injury and this injury is easily related to events occurring in his job place 
and his work.”  He further stated it was “remarkable to [him] that a trained medical 
doctor of any specialty reviewing the history and symptoms of [Employee] would not see 
the obvious connection between his work activity, the event of July 19, 2015, and his 
current exaggerated symptoms of pain in his hand, wrist and forearm.”  He observed that 
the July 19, 2015 event “overstressed” Employee’s hands and wrists and “created the 
acute onset of symptoms.”  He concluded Employee’s current condition “is associated 
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with his assembly line work and specifically [with] an event occurring on July 19, 2015 
that precipitated the acute onset of increased pain and symptoms.” 
 
 Employee sought treatment on his own with Dr. Edward Holliger, an orthopedic 
surgeon.  On September 21, 2015, Dr. Holliger recommended injections and opined that 
Employee’s complaints were work-related.  Employee reported no improvement 
following the injections, and Dr. Holliger then referred him for physical therapy.  On 
December 14, 2015, Employee returned to Dr. Holliger with persistent complaints of 
wrist and hand pain.  Dr. Holliger stated that Employee’s complaints were work-related, 
opining, “[h]e has problems that are greater than 50% attributable to his work and work 
activities over the last many years.”  Dr. Holliger did not causally relate Employee’s 
condition to an acute event on July 19, 2015. 
 
 Thereafter, Employer sought a medical records review from Dr. John Gracy, also 
an orthopedic surgeon.  On February 19, 2016, Dr. Gracy issued a report that noted the 
differing opinions with respect to the cause of Employee’s condition.  He summarized 
several medical studies that sought to confirm a causal link between repetitive motion in 
the workplace and the development or aggravation of arthritic conditions, with 
conflicting results.  Dr. Gracy explained there are multiple risk factors for arthritis and 
ultimately opined, “although [Employee’s] job may have contributed to his arthritis, it is 
not the primary and/or sole cause.” 
 
 Employee returned to Dr. Jemison on March 3, 2016, asking Dr. Jemison to 
reconsider his opinion in light of the reports from Dr. Burton and Dr. Holliger.  Dr. 
Jemison’s record reflects that he told Employee he would provide treatment “outside of 
the Workers’ Compensation System as [he is] obligated to abide by Tennessee State 
Law.”  Dr. Jemison further observed that Employee and his wife “do not like [his] 
opinion and [he has] urged them to find a physician who is well versed in Tennessee 
State Workers’ Compensation laws who is a hand surgeon to formulate another opinion.” 
 
 The case was tried on September 15, 2016.  Employee and his wife were the only 
witnesses to testify, and Employee argued that the opinions of Dr. Burton and Dr. 
Holliger supported his position that his condition was causally related to his 
employment.
1
  In addition, he asserted that Dr. Jemison’s opinion should be discounted 
because he had initially diagnosed Employee with a sprain/strain-type injury only to 
opine later that no injury had occurred.  Employee argued Dr. Jemison’s various 
statements are inconsistent and the opinions of Dr. Holliger and Dr. Burton rebutted the 
presumption of correctness accorded Dr. Jemison’s opinion.  Conversely, Employer 
maintained that Employee had not presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption 
                                                 
1
 The medical records of Drs. Jemison, Burton, Holliger, and Gracy were admitted into evidence during 
the trial.  In addition, Employee offered into evidence partially completed Standard Form Medical 
Reports (Form C-32’s) of Drs. Burton and Holliger. 
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of correctness attached to Dr. Jemison’s opinion, which was further supported by Dr. 
Gracy’s records review. 
 
 On October 7, 2016, the trial court issued an order denying Employee’s request for 
workers’ compensation benefits.  The trial court observed that Employee had submitted 
Standard Form Medical Reports (Form C-32’s) filled out by Drs. Burton and Holliger to 
be used as evidence in lieu of deposition testimony.  However, the reports were 
incomplete in that they failed to include the fourth page of each form, which addresses 
the causation standard applicable for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2014.  The trial 
court found that, because page 4 was missing from each Form C-32, it could not conclude 
Employee had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness 
accorded Dr. Jemison’s causation opinion. 
 
 Employee appealed the trial court’s order, asserting that the physicians had 
completed the missing pages and offered causation opinions supporting his claim, and he 
attached those pages to his notice of appeal.  Employer filed a motion to exclude the 
attached pages, arguing the additional pages were submitted too late.  Employee 
responded that he believed he could present those pages on appeal because the trial court 
informed him during the trial he could submit the missing pages late.
2
  Employer moved 
that the case be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining 
whether the new evidence filed with the notice of appeal should be excluded.  Upon 
remand, the trial court determined those pages were not admissible and issued an order 
excluding them.  The record on appeal has been supplemented with the trial court’s order. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated 
and limited in scope.  Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 
conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 
the evidence is otherwise.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015).  The trial court’s 
decision may be reversed or modified if the rights of a party “have been prejudiced 
because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge: 
 
(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge; 
(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or    
clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
                                                 
2
 During its discussion with Employee regarding the missing pages from the Form C-32’s, the trial court 
stated, “Regarding your comment about the missing page[s], it’s certainly your choice as to whether or 
not you choose to try and file something late.  And, should you do that, you would file it with the clerk; 
and Mr. Quinn would have an opportunity to object to it.” 
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(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material 
in the light of the entire record.”  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015).   
 
 A trial court’s decision concerning the assessment of competing expert medical 
opinions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  Sanker v. Nacarato Trucks, 
Inc., No. 2016-06-0101, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 27, at *12 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 6, 2016).  An appellate court may “find an abuse of 
discretion only if the [trial] court ‘applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical 
conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or 
employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.’”  Wright ex rel. 
Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted).  In reviewing a 
trial court’s exercise of discretion, we presume the trial court is correct and consider the 
evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the decision.  Lovlace v. Copley, 418 
S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. 2013).  “[W]e will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 
court merely because we might have chosen another alternative.”  Johnson v. Walmart 
Assocs., Inc., No. 2014-06-0069, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 18, at *17 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 2, 2015).  That said, such decisions “require a 
conscientious judgment, consistent with the facts, that takes into account the applicable 
law.”  White v. Beeks, 469 S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015). 
 
Analysis 
 
 At trial, an injured employee must prove every essential element of his or her 
claim for workers’ compensation benefits by a preponderance of the evidence.  Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2016); Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-01-
0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 
Aug. 18, 2015).  To be compensable under the workers’ compensation statutes, an injury 
must arise primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.  Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 50-6-102(14) (2014).  This requirement is satisfied “only if it has been shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent 
(50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
102(14)(B).  An injury causes “disablement or the need for medical treatment only if it 
has been shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than 
fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, 
considering all causes.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(C).  The phrase “reasonable 
degree of medical certainty” means that, “in the opinion of the physician, it is more likely 
than not considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or possibility.”  Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(D).  Finally, “[t]he opinion of the treating physician, selected by the 
employee from the employer’s designated panel of physicians . . . shall be presumed 
correct on the issue of causation but this presumption shall be rebuttable by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E). 
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 In the present case, the trial court was faced with competing expert medical 
opinions.  The authorized treating physician, Dr. Jemison, opined that Employee suffered 
from degenerative arthritis, but that this condition was “not primarily related to his work 
activities as there was no injury and his arthritis is very significant.”  This opinion is 
entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 
50-6-102(14)(E).  Employer also offered the opinion of Dr. Gracy, who opined that 
“although [Employee’s] job may have contributed to his arthritis, it is not the primary 
and/or sole cause.”   
 
 Conversely, Employee offered the report of Dr. Burton, who opined that “clearly 
[Employee’s] symptomatology was precipitated by the event which he described on July 
19.”  He also concluded that “[t]he July 19 event simply overstressed this area and 
created the acute onset of symptoms.”  Dr. Burton then stated, “[t]here is absolutely no 
doubt that [Employee’s] current debility is associated with his assembly line work and 
specifically by an event occurring July 19, 2015 that precipitated the acute onset of 
increased pain and symptoms.”  Employee also offered the report of Dr. Holliger, who 
concluded that Employee’s arthritic condition “is greater than 50% caused/associated 
with cumulative trauma from rapid, forceful, repetitive work.”  However, the Form C-
32’s of Employee’s experts, which were offered by Employee as expert medical evidence 
in lieu of depositions, were missing page 4, on which each physician had the opportunity 
to express a causation opinion consistent with the requirements of Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-102(14) (2016).  The trial court denied Employee’s post-
judgment efforts to append these pages to the evidence. 
 
 “In evaluating expert medical opinions, a trial judge may consider, among other 
things, the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their evaluation, the 
information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information 
by other experts.”  Venable v. Superior Essex, Inc., No. 2015-05-0582, 2016 TN Wrk. 
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 56, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 2, 2016).  “A 
trial judge has the discretion to conclude that the opinion of one expert should be 
accepted over that of another expert.”  Sanker, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 
27, at *11-12 (citation omitted).  As stated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “[w]hen 
faced . . . with conflicting medical testimony . . ., it is within the discretion of the trial 
judge to conclude that the opinion of certain experts should be accepted over that of other 
experts and that it contains the more probable explanation.”  Thomas v. Aetna Life and 
Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tenn. 1991) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, a trial court’s determination regarding the relative weight to be given to 
expert medical opinions should be affirmed by a reviewing court unless the reviewing 
court concludes the trial court abused its discretion.  In the present case, we are unable to 
conclude that the trial court’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
 
 Employee argues that his status as a self-represented litigant and his limited use of 
the English language presented barriers that “denied [him] essential assistance” in 
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prosecuting his case.  It is well-settled, however, that pro se litigants must comply with 
the same standards to which represented parties must adhere.  See, e.g., Bates v. 
Command Ctr., Inc., No. 2014-06-0053, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 10, at *3 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 2, 2015).  As one court has observed, 
 
[p]arties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal 
treatment by the courts.  The courts should take into account that many pro 
se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial 
system.  However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between 
fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. 
Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 
same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected 
to observe. 
 
Akard v. Akard, No. E2013-00818-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 766, at *11 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2014).  Accordingly, while we acknowledge the legitimate 
challenges faced by a party who proceeds without an attorney, we cannot relax the 
standards of proof or excuse evidentiary deficiencies.  In the present case, while 
reasonable minds may differ concerning the relative weight to be given the various expert 
medical opinions offered at trial, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion 
in accrediting the medical opinions presented by Employer or otherwise erred in its 
weighing of the evidence.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The trial court’s decision is affirmed, the case is dismissed, and the trial court’s 
compensation order is certified as final. 
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